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Why Does Trend Growth Affect Equilibrium Employment?
A New Explanation of an Old Puzzle
By MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY AND MATTHEW D. SHAPIRO
That the employment rate appears to respond to changes in trend growth
is an enduring macroeconomic puzzle. This paper shows that, in the
presence of a return to experience, a slowdown in productivity growth
raises reservation wages, thereby lowering aggregate employment. The
paper develops new evidence that shows this mechanism is important
for explaining the growth-employment puzzle. The combined effects of
changes in aggregate wage growth and returns to experience account
for all the increase from 1968 to 2006 in nonemployment among low-
skilled men and for approximately half the increase in nonemployment
among all men.
JEL: E24
Keywords: Productivity growth and employment; productivity slow-
down; returns to experience; wage growth.
Explaining the variation in rates of employment over time has been a central question
for labor and macroeconomics and for public policy for several decades. The sudden and
sustained increase in nonemployment beginning in the early 1970s occurred at the same
time as the rate of growth of productivity and wages slowed. From 1970 to 1980, the
nonemployment rate of prime age adult males in the United States rose from 6 percent
to 12 percent (see Figure 1A). These trends were associated with dramatic declines in
labor market attachment among the low-skilled. For high school dropouts, rates of non-
employment rose from 10 percent to 23 percent over the same period (Figure 1B). The
1970s also saw a dramatic slowing of the rate of productivity and wage growth. Trend
growth in wages for all adult males fell 5 percentage points over the 1970s (Figure 2).
Economists have long been tempted to relate the decline in economy-wide wage growth
associated with the productivity slowdown of the 1970s to the persistent deterioration in
equilibrium employment beginning in the early to mid-1970s.1
Supercially, the case for a link between productivity growth and employment rates
appears simple: Should it be surprising that employment declines when the returns to
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work have fallen? The theoretical link between productivity growth and equilibrium
employment, however, has proved elusive. In traditional models of the aggregate labor
market (Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman, 1991), changes in trend
rates of growth of productivity and wages do not affect the steady-state rate of employ-
ment. That is, changes in productivity growth affect equally the returns to work and
the returns to not working, as any violation of this relation will cause an economy to
converge either to full employment or zero employment in the long run. Indeed, in his
survey of traditional models of employment determination, Olivier J. Blanchard (2007,
p.416) concludes that they deliver, to a rst order, long run neutrality of unemployment
to productivity growth. Robert Shimer (2010) demonstrates that the same neutrality re-
sult arises in a balanced-growth version of the Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A.
Pissarides (1994) model. While existing theories have clearer implications for the short
to medium run link between productivity growth and the rate of employment, the under-
standing of the link between them in the long run is weaker. To quote Blanchard (2007,
p.416), The truth is we do not know. And this is a serious hole in knowledge.
Existing literature has attempted to break this employment/growth neutrality result.
Theoretical work on unemployment in labor markets with frictions has identied two
channels through which growth can affect unemployment in the long run. If technolog-
ical change is embodied in new jobs, a process of creative destruction arises whereby
old jobs must be destroyed to update to the technological frontier (Philippe Aghion and
Peter Howitt, 1994). In this environment, faster growth implies higher rates of obsoles-
cence, increased job destruction and increased unemployment, in contrast to the trends
observed in the data. If new technologies are incorporated into all jobs, however, a capi-
talization effect can occur: If the costs of job creation are borne upfront, higher expected
productivity growth causes future prots to be discounted at a lower rate, stimulating
rms' demand for labor through job creation, and reducing unemployment (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides and Giovanna Vallanti, 2007).
This paper identies a novel and complementary explanation for the longstanding puz-
zle of providing a theoretical explanation for the observed low-frequency comovement
of productivity growth and the employment rate. Our explanation of the puzzle is mo-
tivated by an additional salient feature of the data: that the decline in male employment
rates was accompanied by sustained declines in labor force attachment. Accordingly, our
explanation highlights the role of wage growth in the decision of workers to supply labor.
We begin by showing that Blanchard's neutrality puzzle, which refers to the unem-
ployment margin, applies with the same force to the labor supply margin. Absent the
effects we emphasize, standard models of the work/nonwork decision imply that labor
supply is unaffected by changes in trend productivity growth. We show that this result
is overturned once one recognizes that workers face substantial returns to labor market
experience. Since Yoram Weiss (1972), it has been well-understood that the processes
of the accumulation of labor market experience and the decision to supply labor are nat-
urally intertwined. In order to accumulate experience, an individual must work. Conse-
quently, changes in the experience-earnings prole that workers face affect the decision
of a marginal worker to seek lifetime employment.
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A novel and important outcome of our theoretical analysis, however, is that this inter-
play between the return to experience and labor supply also interacts with trend growth
in wages in determining whether or not an individual chooses to work. Faster growth in
aggregate wages compounds the return to experience, raising equilibrium employment.
The interaction between these two processes in the model generates a strong theoretical
rationale for a connection between the rate of wage growth and the level of equilibrium
employment. Intuitively, if the wage escalator attens, either from a decline in the
return to experience or from a slowdown in productivity growth, the payoff to being en-
gaged in the workforce over a lifetime falls, and a marginal worker will nd employment
a less attractive prospect.
To examine the extent to which this new explanation can provide an account of long-
run trends in measures of nonwork, we assess its predictions from two perspectives.
We rst confront the model with the most comprehensive measure of joblessness
nonemploymentgrouping together nonparticipation and unemployment. This choice
is informed by the analysis of Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel
(1991, 2002). While a clear distinction between unemployment and nonparticipation
may exist over the business cycle, they argue that the boundary between these two states
is blurred at low frequencies. In their words, [t]he composition of unemployment has
shifted toward less skilled workers, who suffer comparatively long spells of joblessness
and whose rewards from work have fallen sharply. In both these respects, they resemble
the growing class of men who have simply withdrawn from the labor market (1991,
p. 125). Viewed from this perspective, the model suggests that the combined effects of
changes in aggregate wage growth and returns to experience can account for all of the
increase from 1968 to 2006 in nonemployment among low-skilled men, and around half
of the increase in nonemployment among all men.
This view is not the only interpretation of the model, however. The second perspective
we consider is to align the labor supply margin that we model with the participation
decision, rather than with nonemployment, implicitly grouping together employment and
unemployment. Thus, we also examine the extent to which our explanation can account
for secular trends in nonparticipation. Rates of nonparticipation among prime-age men
in the United States rose profoundly from 4 percent in the late 1960s to 9 percent in the
early 2000s (Figure 1C). Mirroring the skill prole of nonemployment shown in Figure
1B, the process of detachment from the labor market was concentrated among the low
skilled, with high school dropouts facing rises in nonparticipation rates from 5 percent
to 20 percent over the same period (Figure 1D). Reassuringly, the model also provides
a good account of these trends in male labor force participation, over predicting slightly
the rise in trend nonparticipation among low-skilled workers, and accounting for the
majority of the secular rise in aggregate male nonparticipation since the 1960s. Hence,
our novel channel for relating productivity growth to the employment rate nds empirical
support whether viewed through the nonparticipation or nonemployment data.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows.
In Section I, we present a very simple model of labor supply in the presence of a return
to experience and aggregate wage growth in order to provide the basic qualitative intu-
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ition for the effects we emphasize. This theory demonstrates transparently and intuitively
how the returns to experience and the aggregate rate of wage growth interact to explain
the correlation of the level of the employment rate and the rate of growth of productivity
and wages.
We also extend the model in Section I to examine whether the presence of labor mar-
ket frictions may interact with the wage growth channel we emphasize in determining
incentives to supply labor. Qualitatively, we show that frictions shade down the effect
of wage growth on labor supply, and that reductions in job-nding prospects discourage
labor supply. Quantitively, however, we nd that the magnitude of these effects is likely
to be modest.
In Section II, we then present empirical results that conrm the substantial changes in
aggregate wage growth and the return to experience among low-skilled, marginal work-
ers. This section uses Decennial Census and Current Population Survey (CPS) data to
study wage growth and the returns to experience for male workers by level of educa-
tional attainment. We nd signicant changes in aggregate wage growth and the return
to experience that, when combined with our theoretical analysis, help explain the produc-
tivity/employment puzzle. A novel empirical nding is that the lowest skilled workers
have experienced declines in the return to experience. Previous work nds that the re-
turn to experience has generally increased. Our empirical work supports this nding,
but shows how these increases in the return to experience are not shared by the least-
skilled workers. This nding is pivotal for our analysis since these low-skilled workers
are precisely the population on the margin for the work/not-work decision.
In Section III, we extend the simple model of Section I to account for nite worker life-
times, as well as nonlinear experience-earnings proles. Using this generalized model,
we then draw out the quantitative implications of the observed changes in wage growth
documented in Section II for trends in male nonemployment and nonparticipation.
In Section IV we discuss how this paper relates to the literature. In Section V, we offer
conclusions and discuss directions for future work.
I. The Productivity Growth/Employment Interaction: Basic Model
We rst present a simple model that delivers our basic insights on the interaction of
aggregate wage growth and the return to labor market experience, and its role in the
determination of incentives for lifetime employment. Consider a simple environment in
which there are two employment states, employment and nonemployment, and workers
choose whether they want to supply their labor or not. Note that the phenomenon we
are aiming to model is the life-long choice that a worker makes to be committed to the
labor market and therefore accrue the returns to experience. Consequently, we initially
abstract from frictional episodes of unemployment between jobs.
The critical addition that we explore relative to previous literature is to allow for two
forms of wage growthaggregate productivity growth and an individual worker's return
to labor market experienceas well as growth in the ow payoff from nonemployment.
Consider an innitely lived worker i who must make a once-and-for-all decision at the
start of his (non) working life between working forever and not working forever. If he
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works, he accumulates a year of labor market experience x for every year he works,
and faces a wage prole wi .x; t/. Assume that there is a return to experience gx , and
aggregate wage growth gw, such that
(1) lnwi .x; t/ D lnwi .0; 0/C gx x C gwt:
It is straightforward to derive equation (1) as the labor demand equation implied by a
constant returns to scale production technology with fully exible inputs, in which a
worker with experience x accounts for egx x efciency units of labor, and labor augment-
ing technical progress occurs at rate gw over time (see Appendix A for a derivation). If
the individual decides not to work, he does not accumulate experience, and he receives
a payoff from nonemployment equal to bi .t/. Assume that the latter grows over time at
rate gb.2
In this simple environment, all the worker need do is choose the option that delivers
the highest present value of lifetime earnings. In particular, if the discount rate is equal
to r , it is straightforward to show that a newborn potential worker at time t will decide
to work if his offered wage, wi .0; t/ exceeds a reservation wage equal to
(2) wi .0; t/  wRi .t/ D bi .t/ , where   r   gw   gxr   gb :
This simple formulation for the reservation wage relies on an innite horizon specica-
tion and an assumption of geometric growth in this simple model. In Section III below,
we present a more general model that preserves the intuition of this formulation for the
reservation wage while taking into account a more realistic specication of the trajectory
of wages.
A. Wage Growth and Steady-State Employment
A number of insights follow from the simple observation in equation (2). First note
that, while the reservation wage grows over time at the same rate as the payoff from
nonemployment, gb, the wage of a newborn worker, w .0; t/, grows at the rate of aggre-
gate wage growth, gw. To see the signicance of this, imagine an economy populated
by workers facing different wage proles, wi .x; t/ D !iw .x; t/, and different payoffs
from nonemployment, bi .t/ D  ib .t/, but who otherwise face the same labor supply
problem. The variables !i and  i thus represent heterogeneity in skill and the payoff
from nonemployment respectively. It follows that the steady-state employment rate in
2In this context, the ow payoff from nonemployment b must include much more that unemployment compensation,
which has short duration in the U.S. except during deep recessions. Empirically, much of the secular rise in nonemploy-
ment in the U.S. is accounted for by increases in very persistent (full-year) nonemployment spells (Juhn, Murphy and
Topel, 1991, 2002). In addition, the model we present is one of the life-long decision to work. Possible interpretations
of b include the income of other household members, income from employment in turbulent jobs with limited human
capital accumulation, the value of home production and leisure, as well as public health insurance, disability insurance
and social security.
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this economy will be given by
(3) L D Pr [wi .0; t/  bi .t/] D 1 ./ ;
where./ is the c.d.f. of the ratio !i= i , and   b .t/ =w .0; t/ is the replacement rate
for newborn workers.
For employment to be in steady state, the replacement rate  must be stationary. The
replacement rate will be stationary only if the growth rate of the payoff from nonem-
ployment is equal to the rate of aggregate wage growth, gb D gw in steady state. To see
why, imagine for example that gb > gw. In this case, the employment rate will converge
to zero over time as the payoff from nonemployment increasingly dominates the payoff
from work. A symmetric logic holds for the case where gb < gw. Imposing the restric-
tion required for a steady state to exist, gb D gw, implies that the reservation wage may
be rewritten as
(4) wRi .t/ D bi .t/ , where   1  gxr   gw :
Note that the constraint gw D gb is not special to our formulation. Any model with a
steady state will have to impose it.
Together, equations (3) and (4) characterize the determinants of incentives to work in
this simple environment. We observe that changes in employment are driven by changes
in either  or . The effects of changes in the replacement rate  are simple and well-
understood: A higher replacement rate renders nonemployment more attractive and re-
duces steady state labor supply. This effect is a very conventional long run property
of models of equilibrium employment (see Blanchard, 2000; Layard, Nickell and Jack-
man, 1991, among others). The determinants of the variable  are less common in the
literaturethe return to labor market experience, gx , the rate of aggregate wage growth,
gw, and their interaction. We now explore these effects in more detail.
Consider rst the effects of the return to experience. Note from equation (4) that a
positive return to experience, gx > 0, drives a worker's reservation wage below his ow
payoff from nonemployment. The reason is simple. If workers anticipate positive returns
to experience, they will forgo earnings in the short run in order to reap the returns to
experience in the long run. This point has long been noted since Weiss (1972), and more
recently by Susumu Imai and Michael P. Keane (2004), but has been largely neglected
in macroeconomic models where wage growth is linked only to the level of productivity
and not to labor market experience.3 A corollary of this observation is that increases in
3An adundant literature on post-schooling investment in human capital, based on the seminal work of Yoram Ben-
Porath (1967) has highlighted the implications of the joint determination of human capital accumulation and labor supply
for the life cycle proles of earnings and hours worked (Alan S. Blinder and Weiss, 1976; James J. Heckman, 1976; Harl
E. Ryder, Frank P. Stafford and Paula E. Stephan, 1976), education choice (Robert J. Willis and Sherwin Rosen, 1979)
and the estimation of preference and technology parameters (Kathryn L. Shaw, 1989; Chul-In Lee, 2008). See Weiss and
Yona Rubinstein (2006) for a survey. Perhaps most related to the present paper is the analysis of Claudia Olivetti (2006),
who emphasizes the role of changes in returns to experience among women since the 1970s. In contrast to our analysis
of low-skilled males, she nds evidence of steepening experience-earnings proles among women, and identies it as a
key driving force for increased female labor force participation since the 1970s.
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the return to experience will reduce reservation wages even further below the ow payoff
from nonemployment, and therefore will lead to increased employment rates. The reason
is that increases in the return to experience raise the present discounted value of earnings
from working relative to not working.
The key implication of equation (4) that underlies our account for the comovement
between productivity growth and employment is the effect of a change in the rate of
aggregate wage growth, gw. Equation (4) reveals that there is an interaction between
gx and gw: When the return to experience is positive, increases in the rate of aggregate
wage growth lead to reductions in reservation wages, thereby raising aggregate employ-
ment. The simple reason is that greater aggregate wage growth interacts with the return
to experience by compounding the rate of wage growth relative to the growth of the
payoff from nonemployment. Aggregate wage growth acts like compound interest on
the return to experience.4 It is important to note that the latter effect of aggregate wage
growth on incentives to supply labor is absent in traditional models of aggregate employ-
ment determination which abstract from returns to experience and implicitly set gx D 0.
Highighting how a positive return to experience creates an effect of the trend rate of
growth on employment is a central contribution of this paper.
The perceptive reader will observe that the effect of aggregate wage growth in our
model is driven by the specication that experience is multiplicative, not additive, in
determining wages, i.e. that the Mincerian wage equation be specied in logarithms
rather than in levels. The specication that experience and productivity are multiplicative
is, however, much deeper than a functional form restriction. If the returns to experience
were additive in wages, i.e., a xed amount rather than xed percentage, then the returns
to experience would become vanishingly small over time if there is a positive trend to
productivity. So a linearly additive specication for experience is equivalent to assuming
no steady-state return to experience whatsoever.
B. Where Shocks Hit Hardest: The Importance of Marginal Workers
The simple model of this section adds two novel determinants of variation in the ag-
gregate employment rate: the return to experience and the rate of aggregate wage growth.
A more precise expression for the effects of changes in gw and gx on steady state em-
ployment can be obtained from logarithmic differentiation of (3) to obtain,
(5) 1 ln L D  " 1 ln;
4The mechanism for the effect of gw on employment incentives, though simple, can appear subtle. A natural question
is whether this mechanism requires any more than the usual ingenuity that we ask of individuals when we apply our eco-
nomic models to the real world. Our sense is that it does not. Individuals in the model do not care about the composition
of wage growth between aggregate wage growth, and returns to experience; they only have to keep track of overall growth
in wages. The mechanism can appear subtle to economists because we care about delineating the separate effects of gw
and gx .
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where " is the steady state elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage,
(6) " D  
0 ./
1 ./:
Note that " is the elasticity of labor supply on the extensive margin, i.e. the employment
vs. nonemployment margin. Consequently, it measures the elasticity of the inverse c.d.f.
of reservation wages in the economy.5
Thus, we see that the employment effects of changes in the rates of aggregate wage
growth and the return to experience are increasing in the size of the wage-elasticity of
aggregate labor supply, ". The intuition for this result is simple. A small value of "
implies that there are little incentive effects of wages on workers' choice to supply labor.
This in turn extinguishes the labor supply effects of wage growth which rely on the notion
that wages incentivize labor supply.
The employment elasticity " will be particularly large for workers who are low-skilled.
To see this, note that we can write the steady-state employment rate among workers of a
given skill ! as
(7) L .!/ D 1 3.=!/ ;
where 3./ is the c.d.f. of the inverse of workers' idiosyncratic payoffs from not work-
ing, 1= i . It follows that the wage elasticity of the employment rate for workers of skill
! is equal to
(8) " .!/ D 
!
30 .=!/
1 3.=!/:
A sufcient condition for this elasticity to decline with skill, !, is that the modal
worker of that skill is employed.6 Thus, the model predicts that low-skilled workers
respond to changes in the rate of aggregate productivity growth and the return to expe-
rience to a greater extent. The simple reason is that low-skilled workers are more likely
to be on the margin of the employment decision than high-skilled workers, and therefore
are more responsive to changes in the incentives to work.
This prediction of the model formalizes the intuition underlying the empirical analysis
of Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991, 2002). They show that much of the increase in
joblessness in the United States from the 1970s onward is concentrated among low-
skilled workers, an observation that is replicated in Figure 1B. In addition, they provide
estimates of the elasticity of labor supply by skill group (see Table 9 of their 1991 article
and Table 10 of their 2002 article) that conrm that low-skilled labor supply is much
5Focusing on the extensive margin of labor supply abstracts from the possibilities that, facing lower returns to lifetime
work, (a) individuals who work may choose to work more hours per week via the income effect and (b) individuals who
do not work may have chosen to work if they had the option of working more hours per week.
6To see this, note that since =! is declining in !, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply for workers with skill !
will decline with skill if300 .=!/ > 0. If3./ is unimodal, a sufcient condition for the latter is that the modal worker
with skill ! chooses to work.
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more elastic than for higher skilled workers. Both of these results are consistent with
the formal implications of our model. We will see later in Section III that the tight
correspondence between our theoretical model and the empirical results of Juhn, Murphy,
and Topel will enable to us to interpret and quantify the implications of our model for
observed trends in joblessness in the United States over time.
C. Interactions with Labor Market Frictions
Thus far, our analysis has demonstrated the important role of wage growth in shaping
reservation wages in a model in which individuals face no frictions to obtaining work.
A natural question is whether the existence of labor market frictions may interact with
wage growth in determining incentives to supply labor. One of the determinants of the
decision to seek work might be the difculty of obtaining work itself.
To explore this possibility, in this subsection we extend our basic model to incorporate
such frictions. Specically, if employed workers lose their job at rate s, and new job of-
fers arrive at rate f , we show in the Appendix that the reservation wage mirrors equation
(4), except that the  coefcient is modied slightly:
(9) wRi .t/ D Qbi .t/ , where Q  1  gxr   gw
r C f   gw
r C s C f   gw :
This result motivates a number of observations. First, the addition of frictions shades
down the effects of wage growth by a factor rC f gwrCsC f gw < 1. Intuitively, episodes of
frictional unemployment impede the accumulation of labor market experience for an in-
dividual who supplies his labor. Second, consistent with the intuition that motivated this
extension, reductions in the job-nding rate lower the factor rC f gwrCsC f gw , raising reserva-
tion wages, and disincentivising labor supply.
In addition to these qualitative effects, however, equation (9) also provides guidance on
the likely quantitative magnitude of these effects. Specically, for empirically-plausible
values of the ow transition rates s and f , an excellent approximation to the additional
term rC f gwrCsC f gw is simply
f
sC f .
7 A useful interpretation of the latter is that it is equal to
one minus the steady-state rate of frictional unemployment. Thus, a very good intuitive
rule of thumb is to imagine that an individual who supplies his labor will be employed a
fraction fsC f of his working life, and so will accrue the same fraction of the total possible
returns to experience.
By the same token, this interpretation claries that any interactions between the effects
we emphasize and labor market frictions are likely to be modest in magnitude. The rea-
son is that empirically-plausible values for the rate of unemployment imply values of fsC f
that are very close to one. This suggests that the effects of wage growth on reservation
wages implied by the frictionless model underlying equation (4) are a very good guide
to the same effects in the presence of frictions in equation (9). This point does not pre-
7For example, estimates for prime-age males reported by Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey (2006) suggest job-nding
rates of approximately 0.33 and job-loss rates of approximately 0.015 on a monthly basis. These imply annual job-nding
and job-loss hazards of approximately 4 and 0.18 respectively, dwarng analogous values for r and gw .
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clude that changes in wage growth may affect rates of job-nding, and thereby rates of
unemployment, for example via the capitalization effects emphasized by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1998) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007). We return to this point in Section
IV.8
D. Summary of Qualitative Predictions
This section has used a very simple model to elucidate the effects of wage growth on
aggregate employment in an environment that incorporates a return to labor market expe-
rience. It has established the following qualitative predictions: First, increases in the rate
of return to experience reduce reservation wages and stimulate aggregate employment by
increasing the present discounted value of working over not working. Second, if there is
a positive return to experience, increases in the rate of aggregate wage growth will also
reduce reservation wages and raise aggregate employment. And nally, the employment
effects of wage growth, of the return to experience, and of the interaction of wage growth
and the return to experience will be greatest among low-skilled workers who are the most
marginal to the employment decision. The evidence discussed in the next section bears
directly on these effects and how they might inform the growth rate/employment puzzle.
II. Evidence
In this section we take on the task of documenting evidence on changes in aggregate
wage growth and in the returns to experience by skill for workers in the United States
over time. In Section III, we use this evidence, together with a generalization of the
model of Section I, to simulate the effects on employment rates of changes in the return
to experience and its interaction with real wage growth.
A. Changes in Aggregate Wage Growth by Skill
To measure changes in the rate of aggregate wage growth we use March CPS micro-
data for the period 1967 to 2006. We restrict our samples along several dimensions.
First, we concentrate on outcomes for white men since labor force participation issues
for non-whites and women are signicantly more complicated (James P. Smith and Finis
R. Welch, 1989; Welch, 1990; Francine D. Blau, 1998). In particular, we restrict the sam-
ples to non-immigrant white males aged 16 to 64. Mirroring Juhn, Murphy and Topel's
(1991, 2002) inuential analyses of wages and employment by skill in the United States,
we additionally focus on respondents with fewer than 30 years of potential experience
who report that they were out of school for the entire year and are not self-employed.
Wages are measured by dividing annual wages and salary by annual hours worked. As
our theory makes clear, we are especially interested in changes in wage growth for mar-
ginal workers who are relatively low in the skill distribution. We use educational attain-
ment as a proxy measure of skill. We distinguish among high school dropouts (9 to 11
8Our approach in this subsection mirrors a recent literature that has sought to incorporate both unemployment frictions
as well as a labor supply margin. See, for example, Pietro Garibaldi and Etienne Wasmer (2005), Per Krusell, Toshihiko
Mukoyama, Richard Rogerson and Ays¸egul S¸ahin (2011), and the references therein.
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years of education), high school graduates (12 years), those with some college education
(13 to 15 years) and those with a college or higher degree (16+ years).9 Finally, to ensure
that measured changes in aggregate wage growth are not driven by changes in the expe-
rience composition of our samples over time, we compute average wage growth from the
distribution of wages reweighted to hold constant the distribution of experience using the
method of John E. DiNardo, Nicole M. Fortin and Thomas Lemieux (1996).
Figure 2 plots trend hourly wage growth by education from 1968 through to 2006
based on these CPS samples. Specically, this takes estimates of real hourly wages
by education, computes implied annual wage growth by education, and reports the HP
ltered series. This exercise reveals a clear picture of aggregate wage growth in recent
decades. For all educational groups, aggregate wage growth fell in 1970s, rebounded in
the 1980s and 1990s, and has fallen off again in recent years. In addition, we observe
that trend wage growth declined more acutely among low-skilled workers in the 1970s.
Among high school dropouts, wage growth declined secularly in the 1970s from around
3 percent per year to trend real wage declines of approximately 3 percent in late 1970s
and early 1980s. In contrast, real wage growth among college educated workers declined
more slowly in the 1970s, and rebounded more robustly in the 1990s.10
These observations echo well-documented facts on aggregate growth, as well as wages
by skill. The secular decline and subsequent rebound in aggregate wage growth over time
mirrors the productivity slowdown of the 1970s as well as the so-called productivity
miracle of the 1990s in the United States. Figure 2 overlays the trend productivity
growth rate over the same period to emphasize these trends. Likewise, the observation
that wage growth declined more sharply among the low-skilled in the late 1970s and
1980s is consistent with the widely documented increase in wage inequality that emerged
over that period.
B. Changes in the Experience-Earnings Prole by Skill
Tomeasure changes in the experience-earnings prole over time, we employ data taken
from the decennial Censuses from 1960 to 2000, and the American Community Surveys
(ACS) from 2001 to 2007 for the United States.11 Earnings are measured by the an-
nual wage and salary income of respondents. Mirroring our analysis of aggregate wage
growth, we again proxy skill using discrete education categories: high school dropouts (9
to 11 years), high school graduates (12 years), some college (13 to 15 years), and college
9Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002) measure skill by percentiles of the wage distribution, rather than by educa-
tional groups. Reassuringly, they obtain similar results.
10A potentially important confound to the trends in Figure 2 is the growth of non-wage compensation (such as health
insurance, pensions and paid leave) that emerged over the period. It is difcult to get an accurate sense of this from
the data sources we use. However, using the microdata underlying the Employment Cost Index, Brooks Pierce (2001)
shows that wage growth understated compensation growth among high-skilled workers in the 1980s, but that it overstated
compensation growth among the low-skilled in the 1990s. Hence, for total compensation the relative growth rate in
wages for low-skilled workers is likely to be even less favorable than shown in Figure 2.
11Our Census samples are taken from the public use 1% sample for 1960, 2% sample for 1970, and 5% samples for
1980 to 2000 available from IPUMS. They parallel those used by Heckman, Lance Lochner, and Petra Todd (2006)
in their important study of the returns to schooling. We are grateful to those authors for providing us with detailed
tabulations from their work that we used in the preliminary version of this paper.
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degree or higher (16+ years). Experience is measured by potential experience, i.e. age
minus years of education minus six.
We focus on the return to experience among full-time, full-year workers, dened as
those who work 35 hours or more per week, and who are employed for 50 or more
weeks per year. We do this for a number of reasons. By focusing on such workers, we
can be more condent that respondents have left full-time education when we observe
their earnings. Moreover, the observed proles are more likely to reect variation in
wages rather than hours or weeks worked. Finally, the fact that we are able to measure
only potential experience raises a concern that a changing relationship between potential
and actual experience could confound observed changes in experience-earnings proles.
By concentrating on full-time, full-year workers, such a confound is minimized.
Figure 3 plots average log earnings as a function of potential experience by education
group, normalized to the mean log earnings of workers entering the labor market. Log
earnings are normalized to equal zero at zero experience to abstract from the signicant
differences in levels of earnings across education groups and of aggregate wages across
time. These levels shifts in wages do not affect equilibrium employment in our model.
Within each panel, the lines correspond to the experience-earnings proles for different
Census years for a given education group.12 Figure 3A displays the experience-earnings
prole for high school dropouts (9-11 years of education) over time. Note that outcomes
for these lower-skilled workers are of particular interest for our purposes because they are
more likely to be marginal to the employment decision. Figure 3A tells a striking story.
The experience-earnings prole among high school dropouts attened dramatically after
1970. At ve to ten years of potential experience, earnings are around 50 log points lower
in the later period compared to the earlier period. In addition, the gap in the experience-
earnings prole persists at higher levels of experience.
Figure 3B plots the experience prole for high school graduates. This reveals a mild
drop in mid-career earnings between 1970 and 1990, with a more substantial drop in the
experience-earnings prole between 1990 and 2000. In comparison to the outcomes for
high school dropouts, the changes are relatively modest.13
As emphasized above, workers with schooling beyond high school are unlikely to
be at the point in the skill distribution where employment is a marginal decision, so
that patterns in experience-proles among these groups are less relevant to employment
rates. By way of comparison, however, we include results in Figures 3C and 3D for
12Prior to 1980, Census data record only hours last week, and after 1990 only usual hours of work. Reacting to this,
we impose the full-time restriction for the 1960 to 1990 proles based on hours last week. After 2000, we compute the
difference in the experience-earnings prole generated by implementing the full-time restriction using these alternative
hours measures in 1990, when both measures are available. We then apply that difference to impute the experience-
earnings proles from 2000 on.
13For high school graduates and college educated workers, a number of studies in the empirical literature on changes
in wage inequality has estimated the experience premium, measured as the log wage gap between experienced workers
(typically with 25 years of experience) and less experienced workers (5 years of experience) using CPS data (see, for
example, Lawrence F. Katz and David H. Autor, 1999; Bruce A.Weinberg, 2005; Autor, Katz and Melissa S. Kearney,
2008). These studies all have documented evidence for a rise in the experience premium among high school graduates
and college graduates over time. The evidence presented in Section II and the Online Appendix shows the new nding
that the returns to experience among high school dropouts have declined since 1970 and also conrms the ndings of this
earlier literature for higher-educated workers.
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workers with some college education and a college degree or higher respectively. For
these higher skilled workers, an opposite trend can be discerned, especially for college
educated workers, with experience-earnings proles steepening over time.
A number of questions arise in the light of the substantial decline in the experience-
earnings prole for high school dropouts in Figure 3A. First, in the Online Appendix,
we consider the robustness of the result to a range of possibilities, including: a widening
gap between potential and actual experience driven by the increases in joblessness doc-
umented in Figure 1; selection associated with the possibility of high school dropouts
becoming less-skilled over time; and consistency with alternative measures of the ex-
perience premium. On all these dimensions, we nd that the central message that the
experience-earnings prole for high school dropouts has attened substantially remains
robust.
Second, given the robustness of this result, one might ask how big a reduction this
is. A natural way to quantify the decline is to compute the capitalized value of the
experience-earnings proles illustrated in Figure 3A. Figure 4 performs this exercise. It
plots the capitalized value of the experience-earnings proles in Figure 3A, normalized
to equal 100 in 1970, for a range of values for the discount rate. A clear picture emerges:
Regardless of the discount rate, the value of the experience-earnings prole for high
school dropouts declined by almost 50 percent between 1970 and 2007, a substantial
reduction.
C. Synthetic vs. Actual Cohorts
The preceding results report cross-sectional experience-earnings proles at given points
in time. For the purposes of our analysis of the likely employment effects of any changes
in these proles, we would like to obtain information on workers' expectations of their
likely experience prole at the time that they are making their labor supply decisions.
It is likely that these cross-sectional proles are informative to some degree on these
expectationsfor instance, if workers have static expectations or changes are perma-
nent, so that static expectations are rational.
An alternative way of slicing the data, however, would be to plot the realized experience-
earnings proles of individual cohorts. This alternative approach would be consistent
with workers' expectations if they were endowed with perfect foresight. The truth, of
course, is likely to lie somewhere between these two extremes, so it is natural to check
whether the basic message of the data changes by shifting perspective in this way.
Figure 5 presents the realized experience-earnings proles for the cohorts entering the
labor market in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Since the Census data we use is
available only at a decadal frequency, we plot earnings for members of these cohorts
every 10 years.
For high school dropouts, while the cohort proles in Figure 5A are noticeably atter
after ten years of experience, the trends across cohorts tell exactly the same story as the
cross-sectional picture in Figure 3A. Wage growth declines for each consecutive cohort
entering the labor market after 1960, and the declines are of similar magnitude as those
indicated by the cross-sectional proles in Figure 3A. These cohort-based proles mirror
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the ndings of Gueorgui Kambourov and Iourii Manovskii (2009) using CPS and PSID
data. The proles for high school graduates, and those with college education in Figures
5B, 5C and 5D also echo the patterns observed in their cross-sectional counterparts in
Figure 3. Most noticeably, it is again possible to discern a steepening of experience-
earnings prole among younger cohorts of college graduates. It is reassuring that these
two different slices of the data have similar implications with respect to the changes in
returns to experience over time.
III. Quantitative Implications
To what the extent do the changes in aggregate wage growth and experience-earnings
proles documented in Section II account for changes in the rate of nonemployment
documented in Figure 1? In this section, we extend the simple model of Section I. The
extended model retains the transparent qualitative predictions of the simple model while
adding enough generality to allow for analysis based on the earnings proles quantied
in Section II.
A. A More General Model
The model of the Section I is simplied in a number of respects. In this section we
relax some of these simplifying assumptions. First, we allow for nite worker lifetimes.
This enables discussion of the differential effects of changes in wage growth across dif-
ferent cohorts of workers in a natural way. Second, we allow the return to experience to
be nonlinear to allow for the concavity of the experience-log earnings prole observed
in Figures 3 and 5. This allows us to match the experience-earnings prole in the model
with that observed in the data. Third, we allow workers to choose whether to work or not
at each point in their lives, thereby relaxing the once-and-for-all labor supply decision of
Section I. Extending the model in this manner allows us to draw out the dynamic effects
of changes in rates of wage growth on employment in and out of steady state. Though
more realistic, we will see that these changes do not change the basic qualitative message
of the simple model of Section I.
Consider a worker entering the labor market at time s with a working life of length
T . At each point in time the individual chooses whether he wants to work (h D 1) or
not work (h D 0). As in the model of Section I, for every year he works, he accumu-
lates a year of labor market experience, x ; he does not accumulate experience while not
working. A worker of experience x at time t receives a ow wage equal to w .x; t/.14
An individual who does not work at time t receives a ow payoff b .t/. The worker
makes his labor supply decision in order to maximize the present discounted value of his
lifetime income.
Thus, we can state the optimization problem of an individual entering the labor market
14In this more elaborate model, we suppress the i subscript that indexes individuals for purposes of clarity.
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at time s as follows:
(10) max
h.t/
Z sCT
s
e r.t s/y .x; t; h/ dt s.t. Px D h, h 2 f0; 1g , x .s/ D 0;
where r is the real interest rate. The individual's income at time t is given by y .x; t; h/ D
hw .x; t/ C .1  h/ b .t/. If the individual works (h D 1) he receives the wage; other-
wise, he receives the payoff from not working. The rst constraint in (10) regulates the
accumulation of experience over the worker's lifetime such that experience is accumu-
lated only when the individual works. The second emphasizes our focus on the extensive
margin of the labor supply decision. And the third constraint states the initial condition
that new entrants into the labor market enter with no accumulated experience.
The maximization problem in equation (10) can be restated more simply as an optimal
control problem with associated Hamiltonian
(11) H .x; t; h; / D hw .x; t/C .1  h/ b .t/C h:
Note that the Hamiltonian is linear in the labor supply variable, h. It follows that an
individual with experience x at time t will work if the wage offer w .x; t/ exceeds a
reservation wage given by
(12) wR .t/ D b .t/   .t/ ;
where we will see that  .t/  0. Thus, just as in the simple model of Section I, we
observe that the reservation wage lies below the ow payoff from nonemployment. As
before, individuals are willing to forgo payoffs in the short run in order to reap the returns
to experience in the long run.
To characterize the reservation wage more precisely, however, we must describe the
variable  in more detail. Using the principles of optimal control, it is simple to show
that  can be expressed as15
(13)  .t/ D
Z sCT
t
e r. t/h .x . / ;  /wx .x . / ;  / d :
Thus,  has a very intuitive interpretation. It is the cumulative discounted sum of future
returns to experience, wx .x . / ;  /, taking into account that these future returns accrue
only in the event that the individual works in the future (h .x . / ;  / D 1). In short,  is
the marginal value of experience to a worker.
This intuition in turn delivers a simple interpretation of the reservation wage. In par-
15From the principles of optimal control, we can write P D r .t/   @H=@x D r .t/   h .x; t/ wx .x; t/. The
solution to this differential equation is given in equation (13). The constant of integration is equal to zero because of the
transversality condition that  .s C T / D 0.
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ticular, we can rewrite the reservation wage as
(14) wR .t/ D b .t/ 
Z sCT
t
e r. t/h .x . / ;  /wx .x . / ;  / d :
Thus, the reservation wage is equal to the ow benet from not working, b .t/, less the
opportunity cost of not working, which equals the foregone returns to experience. As
stated, the reservation wage is a very forward looking objectit depends on the entire
sequence of future labor supply decisions from time t until the end of the individual's
life, s C T . To obtain a more concrete sense of the form of the reservation wage, we
need to partition the individual's remaining lifetime into episodes allocated respectively
to employment and nonemployment. This is aided by the following result:
PROPOSITION 1: If .i/ r   gw > 0, so that workers discount the future; .i i/ the
experience-earnings prole is monotonically increasing;16 and .i i i/ there are no shocks,
then a worker who decides to work at time t subsequently will work for the remainder of
his working life.
Intuitively, consider an individual who is just about to start working. By denition,
such an individual only just prefers working over not working. As the individual works,
however, he accumulates human capital which in turn serves only to make employment
increasingly preferable relative to not working. As a result, the individual continues to
work until he retires.
In the light of this, we adopt the convention that, whenever the individual is offered his
reservation wage, he works thereafter. It follows that, for an individual with experience
x at time t , we can substitute h .x . / ;  / D 1 and x . / D x C    t for all  > t into
the reservation wage equation above to derive
(15) wR .x; s; t/ D b .t/ 
Z sCT
t
e r. t/wx .x C    t;  / d :
To complete our characterization of the reservation wage, we must be more explicit about
the form of the wage equation. Denoting aggregate wage growth by gw, and the return
to experience at x years of experience as gx .x/  @ lnw .x;  / =@x allows one to write
wR .x; s; t/ D  .x; s; t/ b .t/ ,
where  .x; s; t/ D

1C
Z sCT
t
e 
R 
t [r gw gx .xCz t/]dzgx .x C    t/ d
 1
:(16)
Although the form of the reservation wage in this more general model is not as trans-
parent as equation (4), a number of observations can be made in the light of it. First, note
16Assuming that wx .x; t/ > 0 for all x and t is not entirely innocuous. Evidence suggests that average real wages
can decline with experience at the end of a worker's career. However, it is not clear whether this is driven by (partial)
retirement. For the horizons we focus on in what follows (the rst forty years of working life) nondeclining wages is not
a bad assumption. An extension of the model to account for optimal retirement would be an interesting topic for future
research.
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that the reservation wage takes a form that is reminiscent of equation (4) from the simple
model of Section I. The reservation wage is equal to the ow payoff from not working
b .t/, scaled down by a factor  .x; s; t/  1. As emphasized before, workers are willing
to forgo current earnings to reap the returns to experience in the future. The return to
experience drives a wedge  .x; s; t/ between the payoff from nonemployment and the
reservation wage.
Second, note that in the case where individuals are innitely lived, T ! 1, and
the return to experience is constant for all levels of x , gx .x/  gx , then  .x; s; t/ !
1   gx= .r   gw/ D  from equation (4). Thus, the general model nests the simple
model of Section I as a special case.17
Third, we again observe that changes in the experience-earnings prole, summarized
by gx ./, and aggregate wage growth, gw, affect the reservation wage. As before, in-
creases in the experience-earnings prole and aggregate wage growth reduce  .x; s; t/,
thereby lowering the reservation wage and stimulating work incentives. Equation (16)
is different from equation (4) because it takes into account nite lifetimes and concave
experience-earnings proles, leading to more sensible magnitudes of these effects.
Fourth, a key message of equation (16) is the implied life-cycle effects of changes in
gx ./ and gw. Specically, the marginal effects of these changes on the reservation wage
are stronger for younger cohorts at a given point in time t and weaker for older cohorts.
To see this, consider equation (16) and recall that s denotes time of entry into the labor
market, so that higher values of s refer to younger cohorts. Mechanically, this result
arises because older workers have a shorter remaining working life over which changes
in wage growth of any variety can affect the present value of their remaining earnings
stream. More intuitively, as workers age, they become increasingly less marginal to the
employment decision, and consequently respond less to changes in wage growth.18 We
will see in what follows that these life-cycle effects have distinctive implications for the
dynamics of employment generated by the model.
Finally, to parallel the analysis of Section I.C., the Appendix presents an analogous
solution for the reservation wage that generalizes the more elaborate model of this section
to allow for labor market frictions. Mirroring the results of Section I.C., it shows that the
existence of frictions has a quantitatively modest effect on the reservation wage in the
more general model.
B. Simulations
The results of Section II documented evidence for reductions in the return to labor
market experience for low-skilled, marginal workers since 1970, as well as important
changes in aggregate wage growth for such workers over the same period. We now seek
to provide a quantitative sense of the implications of these trends for work incentives
17Note also that the once-and-for-all labor supply assumption in the simple model of Section I is therefore not a binding
one. This, of course, follows from Proposition 1.
18By the same token, it is also true that the reservation wage coefcient  .x; s; t/ is larger for older cohorts. One
might imagine that this reduces work incentives for older workers. However, we know from Proposition 1 that any
individual who starts working will work until retirement. The reason is the wage growth that workers receive as they
accumulate experience.
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and equilibrium employment. To do this, we feed the observed trends in the experience-
earnings prole and aggregate wage growth into a simulated version of the general model
summarized in equation (16). Since the trends in the aggregate nonemployment rate are
driven by the increase in nonemployment among low-skilled workers, we focus rst on
generating the implied outcomes for high school dropouts.
We set the length of a working life to 40 years, and initialize the model in steady state
in 1968. We set the initial steady-state employment rate to equal 90.7 percent based on
the observed trend nonemployment rate for high school dropouts in 1968 (see Figure
1B). We then compute the implied paths of the employment rate for each experience x ,
cohort s and time t conguration by extending the simple insight of equation (5):
(17) 1 ln L .x; s; t/ D  " 1 ln .x; s; t/ ;
where variation in the reservation wage coefcient  .x; s; t/ is induced by variation
in aggregate wage growth gw and the experience-earnings prole gx ./. Finally, we
aggregate across .x; s; t/ cells to compute the path of aggregate employment, L .t/.
Our simulation procedure therefore requires nding a value of ", the elasticity of labor
supply. Recall from our earlier discussion that, for our purposes, " is the elasticity of la-
bor supply on the extensive marginthe elasticity of the inverse distribution function of
reservation wages (see equations (6) and (8)). Estimates of " for different skill groups are
reported by Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002). Specically, they compute estimates
of the elasticity of the fraction of a year spent in employment with respect to wages by
skill using CPS data. Juhn, Murphy and Topel measure skill by ranges of percentiles of
the wage distribution. Since high school dropouts lie in the bottom 20 percent of the ed-
ucation distribution, Juhn, Murphy and Topel's estimates suggest that a reasonable value
of " is approximately 0.33.19
It is worth noting that our simulation strategy has a number of virtues. First, by re-
ducing the procedure down simply to obtaining a value for ", we have avoided having to
calibrate explicitly variables such as the replacement rate , or the distribution of worker
heterogeneity ./ in equation (3). Since we might be less condent in the correct cali-
bration of these objects, this is a useful simplication. In addition, the simulation strategy
is very transparent. If one has different priors about the appropriate value for the supply
elasticity ", all one need do is scale the implied employment effects up or down accord-
ingly. For example, if one believed " were double the value we use, then the implied
employment effects will be double what we report.
A Simple Example.To get a sense for the dynamic response of aggregate employment
implied by the model, we rst consider the effects of a very simple shock. Figure 6
19To do this, Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002) estimate the wage offers of those out of employment. They do this
by imputing wages to nonworkers using the distribution of wages among individuals who worked between 1 and 13 weeks
in a given year. Table 10 of their 2002 Brookings paper reports partial elasticities (i.e. the change in employment divided
by the log change in wage) by skill percentiles for the years 1972 to 2000. For the 1st to 10th percentile, their estimate
of the partial elasticity is 0.287; for the 11th to 20th percentile, 0.217. The average employment rates for these groups
respectively are 0.73 and 0.80. These imply elasticities of approximately 0:287=0:73 D 0:39 and 0:217=0:80 D 0:27
respectively. Our choice of " D 0:33 is an approximate midpoint of these estimates.
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plots the response of aggregate nonemployment to a one-time, permanent, unanticipated
decline in aggregate wage growth gw from 3 percent (as observed in the early 1970s
among dropouts) to 3 percent (as observed in the mid 1980s among dropouts). The
dashed line plots the steady state nonemployment rate before and after the shock. This
rises substantially from 10 percent to approximately 20 percent.
The response of the nonemployment rate out of steady state, however, reveals im-
portant transitional dynamics in the model. On impact, a discrete fraction of workers
immediately leaves employment, deciding that the reduction in lifetime earnings ren-
ders working no longer worthwhile. Subsequently, the nonemployment rate exhibits
very slow transitional dynamics, eventually reaching the new steady state after 40 years.
These transitional dynamics are a direct consequence of the life-cycle response to shocks
emphasized in the general model above. As workers age, they become increasingly less
marginal to the employment decision, and thereby become less responsive to shocks.
What is driving the dynamics in Figure 6 is the turnover of successive cohorts in the la-
bor market as older cohorts retire, and younger, more marginal workers enter. The period
of transition is exactly 40 years, the specied length of a working life, since that is the
time it takes for all older cohorts at the time of the shock to leave the labor market.
Implications for Low-Skilled Nonemployment.We can now address the question of
the effects of observed changes in the experience-earnings prole and aggregate wage
growth for rates of nonemployment. We begin with results for high school dropouts,
who are more likely to be marginal to the work/non-work decision. In this rst simula-
tion, we match the return to experience in the model, gx ./, to smoothed versions of the
cross-sectional proles for high school dropouts in Figure 3A. Aggregate wage growth
in the model, gw, is matched to trend wage growth among high school dropouts based
on the estimates in Figure 2. We initially feed these trends into the model as a series of
unanticipated shocks.
Figure 7A displays the results of this simulation based on these unanticipated shocks,
together with the trend nonemployment rate among high school dropouts from Figure 1B
for comparison. The model predicts a substantial rise in the nonemployment rate for low-
skilled workers. Figure 7A reveals that the joint trends in gx ./ and gw together imply
an increase in low-skilled nonemployment from approximately 10 percent to 27 percent
between 1968 and 2006. Comparing these outcomes to the observed trend from the data,
this suggests that the model can account for all of the secular rise in nonemployment
among high school dropouts over this period. Thus, variation in the returns to experience
together with changes in the rate of aggregate wage growth have the potential to go a long
way toward explaining the long-run variation in nonemployment for low skilled workers
in the context of this model.
Figure 7A also plots the implied trends in nonemployment from allowing the return to
experience and aggregate wage growth to vary separately. This decomposition suggests
that, between 1968 and 2006, changes in aggregate wage growth and experience-earnings
proles accounted for about an equal share of the implied increase in low-skilled non-
employment in the model. However, it also reveals that the effects of gw are relatively
more important earlier on, whereas the return to experience plays more of a role later on.
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This nding is consistent with the trends depicted in Figures 2 and 3A. Declines in ag-
gregate wage growth occur predominantly in the early part of the sample period, whereas
declines in the return to experience among dropouts occur much more uniformly over the
period.
Another feature of the results in Figure 7A is that the model is less successful in match-
ing the observed timing of the increase in trend nonemployment among high school
dropouts. The data reveal a substantial medium run rise in nonemployment in the 1970s
and 1980s that the model does not fully predict. We do not necessarily view this as a
problem, as it provides room for other explanations to play a role, a point we return to in
Section IV when we discuss how our explanation dovetails with prior literature.
The model's inability to predict the medium run rise in joblessness also may be re-
lated to our choice to feed variation in gx ./ and gw through the model as unanticipated
shocks. It is possible that some of these changes may eventually have been anticipated.
For example, workers may have become wise to the downward trend in aggregate wage
growth seen in Figure 2. This would speed up the response of nonemployment to these
shocks.
To highlight this point, we consider an alternative simulation. As before, the labor
market is assumed to be in steady state at the beginning of the simulation in 1968. In
this case, however, we assume that the time path of aggregate wage growth gw in Fig-
ure 2 is subsequently realized by all cohorts. Symmetrically, instead of using the cross
sectional experience proles from Figure 3, we reveal smoothed versions of the realized
experience proles to successive cohorts of workers.20
Figure 7B displays the results of this simulation based on these anticipated shocks to
wage growth. Consistent with the intuition above, it can be seen that implied nonemploy-
ment in the model tracks the medium run rise in nonemployment in the data remarkably
well, though implied joblessness in the model overshoots the data in the late 1990s.
Implications for Nonemployment by Skill.Up to now, we have focused on implied
trends in joblessness among low-skilled high school dropouts. In this subsection, we
compute implied trends in nonemployment rates for the remaining skill groups. Our sim-
ulation procedure mirrors exactly the method described above for high school dropouts.
For each skill group, we feed the observed changes in the experience-earnings prole and
aggregate wage growth in Figures 2 and 3 through the model as a series of unanticipated
shocks. The only adjustment made is for differences in the extensive elasticity of labor
supply " across skill groups. The results of Section I.B. lead us to expect that " declines
with skill, as more skilled workers are less marginal to the employment decision. The
estimates reported in Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002) conrm this intuition. Based
on those estimates, we apply values of " equal to 0.2, 0.1, and 0.066 respectively for
high school graduates, those with some college education, and those with a college de-
gree or higher. Again, note that the effects of different assumptions on the magnitude
of these elasticities are simply to rescale our reported employment effects up or down
respectively.
20Since this simulation uses the realized cohort experience proles, it can be peformed up to 2000 only.
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Figure 8 plots trend nonemployment rates implied by our simulations, together with
trend nonemployment rates from the data. Figure 8A repeats Figure 7A for ease of
comparison. Figure 8 suggests that observed trends in experience-earnings proles and
aggregate wage growth can account for around 5 of the 10 percentage point increase
in nonemployment among high school graduates, and 3 of the 5 percentage point in-
crease for those with some college education. Consistent with the relative stability of the
experience-earnings proles for these groups in Figure 3, the majority of the implied in-
crease in joblessness among both groups is driven by declines in aggregate wage growth.
Figure 8 also reveals that trends in either form of wage growth can explain none of the 2
to 3 percentage point increase in nonemployment among college graduates. The reason,
of course, the participation of high-skilled workers is not elastic because so few of them
are on the work/non-work margin.21
Implications for Overall Nonemployment.The simulation results allow us to gauge
the extent to which variation in wage growth can account for the increase in aggregate
nonemployment depicted in Figure 1A. We take a share-weighted average of the simu-
lations in Figure 8. These simulated changes in the nonemployment rates by education
group aggregate to 3.4 percentage pointsa little more than half of the 6 percentage
point rise observed in Figure 1A. Hence, taken together, the mechanisms identied in
the paper can account for all of the increase in nonemployment among white male high
school dropouts, and for approximately one half of the increase in the aggregate nonem-
ployment rate over between 1968 and 2006.
An important aspect of the simulations is that they take into account the dynamics of
the adjustments to changes in growth in wages and the return to experience. As seen
in Figure 6, these dynamics can be quite slow. Taking them into account is crucial for
understanding the movement in employment rates. In the simulations, the upturn in wage
growth has a very delayed effect on aggregate employment rates owing to the decisions
of older workers made well before the wage growth increased. Consequently, the upturn
in wage growth exhibited in Figure 2 does not lead to a contemporaneous reversal of the
decline in employment.
Implications for Nonparticipation.Until now, we have interpreted the predictions of
the model as being aligned with secular trends in nonemploymentthe sum of nonpar-
ticipation and unemployment. This is motivated by inuential research noting that the
distinction between unemployment and nonparticipation has become blurred at low fre-
quencies, as low-skilled unemployed workers increasingly have become detached from
21In the working paper version of this paper (Elsby and Shapiro, 2009), we also explore the age structure of the rise
in nonemployment. In the model, older workers are less responsive to wage growth shocks, because they have a smaller
impact on their remaining lifetime earnings. Consistent with this, rates of nonemployment among men aged 16 to 45
rose earlier and more rapidly among younger workers. For those aged 46 to 55, however, the model undepredicts the rise
in nonemployment. This feature of the data is consistent with an abundant literature that has emphasized, to differing
degrees, the role of changes in the generosity of disability insurance in declining labor force participation among older
prime aged men (John Bound, 1989; Bound and Timothy Waidmann, 1992; Autor and Mark G. Duggan, 2003). In the
context of our model, this would correspond to a change in b, the payoff from not working. Since we abstract from
changes in b, we would not expect our simulations to account for all the changes in nonemployment, such as the well-
documented decline in employment for older workers resulting from an expansion in disability payments.
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the labor market, reporting very long spells of unemployment (Juhn, Murphy and Topel,
1991, 2002). However, as we noted in the introduction, an alternative view would be
to interpret the labor supply margin that we model as corresponding to the participation
margin. There are institutional, measurement, and theoretical considerations that poten-
tially blur the distinction between nonparticipation and unemployment. While we incline
to the the Juhn, Murphy and Topel perspective, the alternative perspective that the labor
supply margin addressed by our model bears more directly on nonparticipation has sub-
stantial merit. Hence, in this subsection we explore the predictions of our model when
viewed through the lens of trends in nonparticipation.
Our simulation approach mirrors the preceding analysis of nonemployment; the results
are depicted in Figure 9. Nonparticipation among low-skilled high school dropouts is
predicted by the model to rise substantially from 5 percent in the late 1960s to 24 percent
in the mid 2000s. This tracks the increase seen in the data quite closely, though over
predicts slightly the rise in nonparticipation by 2 to 4 percentage points over time. As
in the results in Figure 8, declines in returns to experience and aggregate wage growth
appear to account for roughly equal parts of the rise in low-skilled nonparticipation, with
the productivity slowdown the more dominant earlier in the period.
For the remaining skill groups, the model accounts for 4.5 of the 8 percentage point
rise in nonparticipation among high school graduates, and for 3 of the 4 percentage point
rise among those with some college. As in the results for nonemployment in Figure
8, almost all of the rise in nonparticipation predicted by the model for these workers
can be traced to declines in aggregate wage growth that accompanied the productivity
slowdown, reecting the more modest changes in the experience earnings prole among
these skill groups compared to high school dropouts (Figure 3).
Taking a share-weighted average of these predicted effects suggests that the model
predicts 4 of the 5 percentage point rise in aggregate nonparticipation among prime-age
men. Thus, viewed from either the participation margin or the employment margin, the
model is able to account for a substantial fraction of the rise in labor force detachment
among American men since the late 1960s. The model is able to account for a larger frac-
tion of the secular rise in nonparticipation than in nonemployment, however. The simple
reason is that the long-run increase in nonparticipation across skill groups is slightly
smaller than that for nonemployment.
IV. Related Literature
This paper identies a novel explanation for why reductions in trend productivity
growth are associated with secular declines in rates of employment. A natural ques-
tion is how this new explanation contrasts with existing stories for the decline in male
employment, and its coincidence with the productivity slowdown.
A. Search, creative destruction and capitalization effects
As noted in the introduction, an important class of models of labor markets with fric-
tions has explored the link between productivity growth and unemployment. As empha-
sized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), the predictions of these models rely crucially
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on the degree to which new technologies are embodied in newly-created jobs. In mod-
els of creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt, 1994), the productivity of a job is xed
according to the state-of-the-art technology available upon creation of the employment
relationship. In order to update productivity back to the frontier, older relationships must
be severed, hence creative destruction. A drawback to models in this vein is that they
can have counterfactual predictions with respect to the effects of productivity growth on
rates of worker reallocation and the level of unemployment (Blanchard, 1998). Viewed
through the lens of these models, declines in productivity growth, such as the slowdown
in the 1970s, imply that the rate at which jobs become obsolete slows, reducing job de-
struction, and thereby unemployment. In contrast to these predictions, the productivity
slowdown in the United States was characterized by increased rates of job destruction
and increased unemployment.22
If new technologies may be incorporated into jobs of all vintages, however, a capital-
ization effect can arise (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). The idea is that the creation of
new jobs involves the costly process of lling a vacancy. These costs are borne upfront
and are set against the stream of future prots generated by the employment relation-
ship. A slowdown in productivity growth raises the rate at which these future prots are
discounted, reducing the returns to job creation, and raising unemployment.23
The mechanism put forward in the present paper complements this capitalization ef-
fect in a number of respects. First, the two approaches capture quite different aspects of
the decline in employment that followed the productivity slowdown. The capitalization
effect noted by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) emphasizes the impact of declines in
trend growth on the demand for labor over the long run. In doing so, it seeks to provide
an account of the rise in episodes of frictional unemployment that accompanied the pro-
ductivity slowdown. In contrast, the view put forward in this paper provides an account
of the decline in labor market attachment, and the concomitant rise in long jobless spells,
that were observed in the wake of the slowdown in productivity growth. Accordingly, the
emphasis in the present paper is on the effects of aggregate wage growth on incentives to
supply labor.
Second, the analysis of Section I.C. revealed that the existence of labor market frictions
was likely to have only a modest effect on the impact of wage growth on reservation
wages that we emphasize. The absence of such interactions suggests that the implications
of our theory are approximately additive with the capitalization effects emphasized by
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), which operate through their effects on labor market
frictions, in particular the job-nding rate.
Finally, the results of Section III revealed that the model of this paper could account
for the magnitude of the secular rise in nonemployment among the lowest-skilled edu-
cation group. This is precisely the subgroup of the labor market on the margin of the
22For example, the data analyzed by Steven J. Davis (2008) reveal that rates of job loss in the U.S. rose secularly in
the 1970s and 1980s when the productivity slowdown occurred, a trend that reversed in the late 1980s and 1990s when
productivity growth rebounded.
23Alan Manning (1992) identies a capitalization effect in a different context within a dynamic model of union bar-
gaining. In his model, slower productivity growth reduces the future rents from employment available to workers.
Consequently, unions capture rents in the present, raising wage pressure, and increasing unemployment.
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work/non-work decision that experienced signicant rises in long jobless spells (Juhn,
Murphy and Topel, 1991, 2002), which in turn is also the phenomenon our model seeks
to encapsulate. In contrast, the model could account for around one half of the increase
in aggregate nonemployment. The results of our quantitative analysis therefore leave
room for other potential explanations, such as the capitalization effect emphasized by
Mortensen and Pissarides. In their quantitative analysis, Pissarides and Vallanti (2007)
nd that plausible calibrations of the capitalization effect can account for part of the
empirical relationship between unemployment and trend growth, perhaps around one
third.24 This, in turn, leaves room for the effects emphasized in the present paper and
vice versa.
Overall, this suggests that these two explanations are largely complementary, both in
terms of being conceptually distinct, and in terms of their quantitative predictions.
B. Does the short run last a long time?
Perhaps because traditional models tend to predict no long run employment effects of
changes in productivity growth, a prominent feature of previous literature has been in
its emphasis on the potential short run employment effects of variation in productivity
growth (see among others Blanchard, 2000; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Laurence Ball and
Robert Moftt, 2001). A popular idea that has been pursued is that the wage demands
of workers are somewhat sluggish in their response to changes in productivity growth.
Blanchard (2000) has suggested that a comprehension lag can arise between the mo-
ment of an initial decline in productivity growth and the time that workers become aware
of it. Similarly, Ball and Moftt (2001) have emphasized the possibility of sluggish
wage aspirations that do not adjust immediately to declines in the sustainable rate of
aggregate wage growth. Both of these possibilities will lead to a short run rise in jobless-
ness. Moreover, depending on the sluggishness of reservation wages, the short run can
last a long time.
A limitation to this approach, emphasized in Blanchard (1998), is that it becomes dif-
cult to explain very persistent declines in employment following a productivity slow-
down, unless one is willing to impose extreme forms of sluggishness in reservation
wages. Such a task becomes especially difcult given the observed rebound in aggre-
gate wage growth that accompanied the productivity miracle of the 1990s. Models of
sluggish adjustment in reservation wages would predict reductions in joblessness in the
1990s. There was a decline in unemployment across the board in the late 1990s, though
not for a long-enough period to change much the picture of trends in nonemployment
shown in Figure 1. Interestingly, our model contrasts with these predictions. The results
of Section III imply that the productivity slowdown of the 1970s led to increased jobless-
ness over long (thirty year) horizons, rather than short horizons. Thus, while models of
sluggish adjustment in reservation wages may account for the short to medium run rise
in joblessness in the 1970s and 1980s, our model can account for the persistent rise in
24Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) nd that calibrations of the capitalization effect can account fully for the empirical
relation between unemployment and productivity growth only if jobs last almost indenitely, and wages are unresponsive
to labor market conditions.
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nonemployment into the 1990s. Recall that this is driven by the important employment
dynamics that are emphasized when one takes into account the effects of human capital
accumulation on work incentives over the lifecycle.
C. Skill-biased technical change and the decline in employment
A nal related explanation of the secular decline in male employment rates does not
appeal to the productivity slowdown, but rather to the concurrent rise in wage inequality
in the 1970s and 1980s. Low-skilled workers in the United States experienced sustained
declines in their real wages over this period (Bound and George Johnson, 1992; Juhn,
Murphy and Topel, 1991, 2002), a fact reiterated in Figure 2. This fact in turn suggests a
simple explanation for the decline in low-skilled employment: If marginal workers face
reductions in their wage, it seems intuitive that they would respond by withdrawing their
labor supply (Juhn, 1992).
Our analysis provides a number of interesting perspectives on this hypothesis. First,
it is worth re-emphasizing that, since our model explains just part of the overall rise
in trend nonemployment, other explanations play a complementary role. Consider the
timing of the rise in nonwork predicted by our model compared to the timing of the rise
in wage inequality. The decline in wages experienced by low-skilled workers starting in
the 1970s halted by the early 1990s, and reversed signicantly later that decade (Juhn,
Murphy and Topel, 2002). In contrast, our simulations in Section III reveal that, while
the model could account for the persistence of the rise in nonemployment into the late
1990s and 2000s, it under predicts the medium-term rise in the 1980s. Thus, there is
room for a joint explanation of the overall decline in trend employment rates.
In addition to this, however, our model further highlights an important necessary con-
dition for declines in the level of wagessuch as those associated with the rise in wage
inequalityto have an impact on employment rates: It must be that the payoff from
nonwork (denoted b in our model) did not fall in tandem with the wages of less-skilled
workers. Prior literature often has assumed that it would, usually by appealing to the fact
that unemployment compensation is often a xed fraction of prior wages. To the extent
that this were so, reductions in wage levels of low-skilled workers that accompanied the
rise in wage inequality would have a muted effect on employment. Assessing the extent
to which replacement rates have risen over time, especially among the low-skilled, is
therefore a worthy topic of future research.
V. Conclusion
Rates of joblessness among males in the United States have risen dramatically since
the 1970s. These trends are particularly acute among the low-skilled. This paper pro-
vides an economic rationale through which changes in wage growthboth aggregate
wage growth across time, and wage growth associated with the accumulation of work
experiencemay have an effect on work incentives. In particular, the paper shows that
in a generic model of labor supply, the interaction between a positive return to experience
and the trend growth in wages driven by productivity will cause a decrease in the rate of
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productivity growth to increase equilibrium nonemployment. Accordingly, our modeling
provides a novel explanation for correlation between the growth rate and the employment
rates, a correlation that is difcult to derive in traditional models with steady states.
The paper examines both types of wage growththe overall trend in real wages and
the return to experience. It conrms the well-known nding that wage growth has fallen
since the 1970s, especially for low-skilled workers. It presents novel evidence that the
return to experience has also fallen sharply for the lowest-skilled workers. In contrast, as
the previous literature has emphasized and as we conrm, for most workers the return to
experience has increased.
The paper combines the evidence on wage growth and the returns to experience with
its model of labor supply to show that much of the increase in nonemployment among
low-skilled males in the United States since 1970, and around half of the increase in
aggregate male nonemployment can be explained by the model. Thus, this paper intro-
duces both a new explanation for the longstanding puzzle that productivity growth rates
and employment rates move together, and provides evidence that this explanation has
signicant empirical relevance.
A number of important issues arise for future work in the light of these results. First,
in an economy such as the United States with limited social insurance mechanisms, it
is natural to ask what sources of income individuals have at their disposal when they
experience persistent periods out of work. Potential sources may include income from
intermittent employment spells with limited scope for human capital accumulation, and
income of other household members (which may interact with increases in female la-
bor market participation over time). Future study of these alternative income sources
would shed important light on why employment rates among the low-skilled have been
so elastic over time.
Second, what caused the equilibrium deterioration in wage growth we see in the data?
Of particular interest is why the experience-earnings proles among male high school
dropouts attened since the 1970s. Our analysis suggests this is unlikely to be related to
increased differences between potential and actual experience, sources of selection over
time, or to particular data sources. Further analysis of the determinants of the returns to
experience seems warranted to provide a coherent explanation for these trends.
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APPENDICES
A1. Main Theoretical Results
Derivation of Equation (1).Imagine rms face a constant returns to scale production
technology that uses efciency units of labor A .x; t/ n, as well as capital k to produce
output y according to
(A1) y D F .A .x; t/ n; k/ , where A .x; t/  egw tCgx x :
From the linear homogeneity of the production technology, the marginal products are
homogeneous of degree zero, so that we can write
(A2) F j .A .x; t/ n; k/ D F j

A .x; t/
n
k
; 1

 f j

A .x; t/
n
k

, for j D 1; 2:
Using this, the rst order condition for optimal capital demand implies A .x; t/ nk D
f  12 .pk/, where pk is the price of capital. Substituting into the rst order condition
for optimal employment, we obtain w .x; t/ D A .x; t/ f1
 
f  12 .pk/

. Taking logs and
dening w .0; 0/  f1
 
f  12 .pk/

yields equation (1) stated in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1.Consider a worker with experience x at time t who is just
indifferent to working, so that w .x; t/ D wR .x; t/. Note that the time derivative of the
market wage is given by
(A3) Pw D gww .x; t/C h .x; t/ wx .x; t/ ;
since Px D h .x; t/. Likewise, noting that Pb D gwb .t/, and P D r .t/ h .x; t/ wx .x; t/,
the time derivative of the reservation wage is given by
(A4) PwR D gwwR .t/  .r   gw/  .t/C h .x; t/ wx .x; t/ :
It follows that, when the individual is just indifferent between working or not, the time
derivative of the difference between the wage and the reservation wage is given by
(A5) . Pw   PwR/jwDwR D .r   gw/  .t/ :
Under the assumptions that r gw > 0 and wx .x . / ;  / > 0 for all  , the shadow value
of experience in equation (12) has the property that
(A6)  .t/

> 0 if h . / D 1 for any  > t;
D 0 if h . / D 0 for all  > t:
Given this, we can conclude that
(A7) . Pw   PwR/jwDwR

> 0 if h . / D 1 for any  > t;
D 0 if h . / D 0 for all  > t:
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Thus, whenever a worker is indifferent between working or not at a point in time, two
outcomes are possible: If he intends to work at any point in the future, he will start
working now and will work for the rest of his life, since his offered market wage is rising
above his reservation wage from below. On the other hand, if he never intends to work
in the future, he will be indifferent between working and not working for the rest of his
life. It follows that any wage offer slightly above the reservation wage will lead a worker
to work for the rest of his life, and any offer slightly below his reservation wage will lead
a worker to not work for the rest of his life.
A2. Interactions with Labor Market Frictions
Innite Lifetimes and Linear Returns to Experience.If employed workers ow into
nonemployment at rate s, and nonemployed individuals receive job offers at rate f , then
the Bellman equations for the value of employment E .x; t/ and nonemployment N .x; t/
may be expressed as
r E .x; t/ D w .x; t/C s [N .x; t/  E .x; t/]C dE .x; t/
dt
;
r N .x; t/ D b .t/C f max fE .x; t/  N .x; t/ ; 0g C dN .x; t/
dt
:(A8)
We seek to solve for the reservation wage wR .x; t/ that sets E .x; t/ D N .x; t/C ", for
" > 0 approaching zero. To solve this system of value functions, conjecture that they
take the following simple form
(A9) E .x; t/ D Eww .x; t/C Ebb .t/ , and N .x; t/ D Nww .x; t/C Nbb .t/ :
Imposing the conjecture, noting that dE .x; t/ =dt D Ew .gw C gx/ w .x; t/C Ebgwb .t/
and dN .x; t/ =dt D Nwgww .x; t/ C Nbgwb .t/ because there is no accumulation of
experience while out of work, equating coefcients and solving yields
Ew D r C f   gw
.r C f   gw/ .r C s   gw   gx/  s f ;
Eb D s
.r   gw/ .r C s C f   gw/ ;
Nw D f
.r C f   gw/ .r C s   gw   gx/  s f ;
Nb D r C s   gw
.r   gw/ .r C s C f   gw/ :(A10)
Solving for the reservation wage yields equation (9) in the main text.
Finite Lifetimes and Nonlinear Returns to Experience.In the presence of labor mar-
ket frictions, the expression for the marginal value of experience (analogous to equation
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(12) in the main text) for an individual who enters the labor market is given by
(A11) Q D E
Z T
0
e r I . /wx .x . / ;  / d ;
where I . / is an indicator function that equals one if the individual is employed at time
 and zero otherwise, and where we have used the results of Proposition 1, which apply
analogously to this more elaborate problem. Expanding and collecting the relevant terms
implies that we can rewrite the opportunity cost of not working as
(A12) Q D w .0; 0/E
Z T
0
e .r gw/C
R x. /
0 gx .z/dzI . / gx .x . // d :
In general, solving this expression further is complicated by the presence of the terms
in I . / and x . /, which are (related) random variables. However, it is possible to get a
sense of its likely form by noting that the job-nding rate f is very large in practice. For
example, estimates reported in Fujita and Ramey (2006) suggest that f  4 on an annual
basis over the period 1976 to 2006. This observation has a number of useful implications
in the present context:
1) The probability of employment E [I . /]  p . / evolves according to the differ-
ential equation p0 . / D f 1  p . / sp . /. Together with the initial condition
p .0/ D 0, this implies that p . / D 1  e .sC f /  fsC f . For large f , a very good
approximation to the latter is p . /  fsC f  p.
2) The variance of an individual's employment status var [I . /] D p . / 1  p . / 
p .1  p/ for large f . In addition, since p  fsC f  1, it follows that var [I . /] 
0.
3) Finally, note that an individual's experience x . / D R 0 I . / d . It follows from
the above that E [x . /]  p and var [x . /]  0.
Given these approximations, it is possible to write
(A13) Q  w .0; 0/
Z T
0
e .r gw/C
R p
0 gx .z/dz pgx .p/ d :
Solving for the reservation wage of an individual entering the labor market yields
(A14) wR .0; 0/  Qb .0/ , where Q D

1C
Z T
0
e .r gw/C
R p
0 gx .z/dz pgx .p/ d
 1
:
Comparison of the latter with equation (15) in the main text reiterates the message of
Section I.C. The approximate effect of allowing for labor market frictions is to attenuate
slightly the return to experience by a factor equal to p  fsC f  1.
Figure 1.  Nonemployment and Nonparticipation Rates for White Males: Aggregate and by Education 
  
  
 
Notes: Data are taken from March Current Population Survey microdata for white males aged 16 to 64 with fewer than 30 years of 
potential experience, who report that they are neither students nor self employed.  Nonemployment and nonparticipation rates are 
respectively computed as the fraction of year spent out of work and out of the labor force.  Weeks worked prior to 1976 are 
intervalled. Rates prior to 1976 are computed by applying within-interval means from post-1976 data to pre-1976 data.  Bold black 
lines are HP trends with an annual smoothing parameter of 100.
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Figure 2.  Trend Hourly Wage Growth by Education 
 
 
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on March Current Population Survey microdata from 1968 
to 2006.  The series report HP filtered real annual wage growth by education group.  Data are for 
white males aged 16 to 64 with fewer than 30 years of labor market experience.  Hourly wages 
are computed by dividing weekly wages by weekly hours.  Aggregate wages are computed as the 
mean of the distribution of hourly wages, reweighted to hold constant the distribution of 
experience using the method of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). Productivity growth is 
computed from the BLS output per hour series for the business sector. The HP smoothing 
parameter is 100. 
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Figure 3. Experience-Earnings Profiles, by Education and Census Year 
  
  
 
Notes:  Profiles are based on data for full-time, full-year white males aged 16 to 64 from the 1960 to 2000 decennial Censuses, and 
pooled 2001 to 2007 American Community Survey samples. Mean log earnings are normalized by the mean log earnings of workers 
entering the labor market.
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Figure 4. Capitalized Value of Experience-Earnings Profile, Normalized to 1970,                       
9-11 Years of Education, by Census Year and Discount Rate 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations of the capitalized value of earnings over a thirty year horizon, 
discounted at rate r, and normalized to equal 100 in 1970.  Data used for the calculation are the 
experience profiles for 9–11 years of education underlying Figure 3A. 
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Figure 5.  Earnings Profiles by Cohort and Education 
  
  
Notes:  Profiles are based on same data as those underlying Figure 3. Mean log earnings are normalized by the mean log earnings of 
workers entering the labor market. Data points for 2010 are imputed under the assumption that the experience-earnings profile from 
pooled 2001 to 2007 ACS data is time invariant. 
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Figure 6.  Simulated Response of Nonemployment Rate to an Unanticipated, Permanent Decline 
in Aggregate Wage Growth 
 
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Figure plots the response to 
a permanent unanticipated decline in gw from 3 percent to –3 percent.  The discount rate r = 0.04, 
and the experience-earnings profile is fixed at its 1980 level in Figure 3A. 
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Figure 7.  Model Response of Nonemployment among High School Dropouts 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Unanticipated shocks: 
Cross sectional experience profiles (Figure 3A) and aggregate wage growth (Figure 2) are fed 
through as unanticipated shocks.  Anticipated shocks: Cohort experience profiles (Figure 5A) 
and aggregate wage growth (Figure 2) are fed through the model as anticipated shocks. The 
discount rate r = 0.04.  Simulations that vary gw only (squares) hold the experience profile fixed 
at its 1980 level.  Simulations that vary gx only (pluses) hold aggregate wage growth fixed at the 
temporal mean of the series for high school dropouts in Figure 2 (approximately zero).
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Figure 8. Implied Response of Nonemployment by Education to Observed Changes in Experience-Earnings Profile and Aggregate 
Wage Growth 
 
  
  
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Observed changes in the experience-earnings profile and 
aggregate wage growth are fed through the model as unanticipated shocks (as in Figure 7A).  The discount rate r = 0.04.  When the 
experience-earnings profile is fixed, it is held at its 1980 level.  When aggregate wage growth is fixed, it is held at zero. 
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Figure 9. Implied Response of Nonparticipation by Education to Observed Changes in Experience-Earnings Profile and Aggregate 
Wage Growth 
 
  
   
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Observed changes in the experience-earnings profile and 
aggregate wage growth are fed through the model as unanticipated shocks (as in Figure 7A).  The discount rate r = 0.04.  When the 
experience-earnings profile is fixed, it is held at its 1980 level.  When aggregate wage growth is fixed, it is held at zero. 
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